How Does Income Inequality Affect Market Outcomes in Vertically Differentiated Markets? by Yurko, Anna
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How Does Income Inequality Affect
Market Outcomes in Vertically
Differentiated Markets?
Anna Yurko
The University of Texas at Austin
May 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4028/
MPRA Paper No. 4028, posted 13. July 2007
How Does Income Inequality Aﬀect Market
Outcomes in Vertically Diﬀerentiated Markets?
by Anna V. Yurko
Working Paper
First draft: May 2006
This version: July 2007
Very preliminary
Abstract
The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the
structure of a vertically diﬀerentiated industry when consumer’s willingness to
pay depends on his income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982)
model for a general specification of consumers’ income distribution to investigate
the eﬀect of inequality on firms’ entry, product quality, and pricing decisions.
The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to
the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among
the entrants. This is due to the elasticity of consumer demand for quality be-
ing higher in more inegalitarian economies. More intense quality competition
among firms causes them to locate their products in higher ranges of the quality
spectrum, closer to each other, decreasing the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. How-
ever, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to
serve only the rich segment of the market, and the low price elasticity of de-
mand of these consumers allows him to charge a higher price. The conclusion
is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.
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Part I
Introduction
In this paper I study decisions of the firms operating in a vertically diﬀerentiated
market. The products oﬀered in such a market diﬀer in quality. The consumers
are perfectly informed of the products’ characteristics and have the same rank-
ing over the products, preferring higher quality products to inferior ones. Thus,
if prices were the same, the consumers would all choose to buy the top quality
good. In this type of market the demand for the products is directly aﬀected
by the properties of the consumers’ income distribution. If the consumers have
diﬀerent incomes and thus, diﬀerent willingness to pay for higher quality prod-
ucts, firms can profitably split the market by oﬀering products diﬀerentiated
in qualities at diﬀerent prices. Therefore, in vertically diﬀerentiated markets,
income inequality among consumers becomes a key factor in determining the
product varieties oﬀered by the firms.
The purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀect of income inequality on
market outcomes in vertically diﬀerentiated markets. The line of research linking
income distribution of the consumers to the industry structure dates back to
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), and has been cultivated by them (1980) as well
as by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1987). These authors demonstrate that
the interplay of the industry cost structure and demand conditions, which are
the outcome of the underlying income distribution, determine the degree of
concentration and the maximum number of firms in vertically diﬀerentiated
markets (Shaked and Sutton (1987)). They have almost nothing to say, though,
about what kind of products these firms would be producing.
The paper most closely related to this one is Benassi, Chirco and Colombo
(2006). These authors analyze the eﬀect of income concentration on product
diﬀerentiation and obtain solutions for quality and pricing decisions of duopolis-
tic firms. To obtain analytical results they assume that consumer incomes are
distributed with a trapezoid distribution, and that the market is not covered.
In this paper I propose to further this research agenda by modifying the ex-
isting models to make them applicable for studying the eﬀects of changes in
the consumers’ income distribution on the firms’ entry decisions and the opti-
mal choices of product attributes and prices for a more general specification of
the income distribution function. I solve the model numerically to obtain the
equilibrium number of firms in the market, the qualities they produce, and the
prices they charge.
The most valuable insight from the present analysis is that income inequality
among consumers aﬀects the intensity of competition. The result that greater
income inequality enables more firms to enter the industry with positive market
shares dates back to Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and has been replicated in
most of the works that followed. In this paper I am also able to demonstrate
that income inequality impacts the degree of product diﬀerentiation in the mar-
ket through its eﬀect on the elasticity of consumer demand for product quality.
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Greater inequality in consumer incomes results in more intense quality compe-
tition among firms. This is due to the elasticity of market demand for quality
being higher in more inegalitarian economies. More intense quality competition
among firms causes them to locate their products in higher ranges of the quality
spectrum, closer to each other, decreasing the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. How-
ever, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to
serve only the rich segment of the market, and the low price elasticity of demand
of these consumers allows him to charge a higher price.
The theoretical tool used in this project is an extension of the Shaked and
Sutton (1982) model. In their seminal paper the authors describe a model of
monopolistic competition in a vertically diﬀerentiated industry. They use a three
stage game to characterize industry equilibrium in which firms choose both the
qualities of their products and their prices. The outputs of their model are the
number of firms in the market, product qualities and prices, and the major input
is the income distribution of the consumers. In order to be able to solve the
model analytically, they make very specific assumptions about the distribution
of consumer incomes (uniform on [a; b], where 2a < b < 4a). These assumptions
enable the authors to obtain an analytical solution, but make the environment
of the model unfit for studying the eﬀects of changes in income distribution on
market outcomes.
In this project I bypass the strict requirements for applicability of analytical
tools by developing a computer code for solving the Shaked and Sutton (1982)
model numerically for a more general and empirically relevant specification of
income distribution. After describing the model in Part 2, I outline the solution
method in Part 3. The discussion in this part also includes the issues of existence
and uniqueness of equilibria. Part 4 of the paper gives the results of the model.
Part 5 concludes with possible extensions and plans for future research.
Part II
The Model
The analysis here follows very closely that of Shaked and Sutton (1982). The
economy is inhabited by two kinds of agents: consumers and firms. The firms
produce distinct, substitute goods, that are diﬀerentiated by quality. Consumers
are heterogeneous in income and have preferences over the goods produced by
firms, with the ordering of preferences being identical for all consumers. They
can choose to purchase only one good, basing their decision on the choice of
qualities they face and prices, or make no purchase. These decisions gener-
ate demand functions for the firms, who face a more complicated oligopolistic
competition problem.
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Each of the firms produces only one good. They compete in a three-stage
non-cooperative game. In the first stage each of the firms chooses whether it
would enter the market. In the second stage, upon observing the number of
entrants, firms that have entered the industry choose the specifications of their
product, that is, its quality. In the last stage firms observe both the number
and quality choices of their rivals and set their prices.
The game is solved using Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium concept, be-
ginning at the last stage of the game and moving up the game tree.
Stage 3. Choosing Optimal Prices.
Denote the number of firms that have entered the industry in stage 1 of
the game by N . These firms produce distinct, substitute goods. Each firm
k = 1; :::; N produces a good of quality k. Denote the quality level of firm k’s
product by uk. These uk’s have been chosen at stage 2 of the game and at
the current stage are common knowledge. Assume these qualities are ordered
u0 < u1 < ::: < uN ·
_
u, where u0 is the quality of the outside good, and
_
u is
an exogenous upper bound on quality. The price of the outside good is p0 = 0.
Let ck = c(uk) be the marginal cost incurred in production of good k. Each
firm k is choosing the price of its product pk.
The economy is inhabited by a continuum (measure one) of consumers iden-
tical in tastes but heterogeneous in income. Each consumer has income t which
is distributed with a cdf F with support on [0;1).Consumers purchase only
one good or make no purchase and consume an outside good k = 0. For every
consumer good k is characterized by the level of utility he/she obtains from
consuming good k, which is assumed to be equal to uk, and price of this good
pk. The preferences of consumer with income t from consuming good (uk; pk)
are described by utility function1
U(t; (uk; pk)) = uk (t¡ pk): (1)
Define the income level tk such that a consumer with income tk is indiﬀerent
between purchasing good k at price pk and good k ¡ 1 at price pk¡1. That is,
U(tk; (uk; pk)) = U(tk; (uk¡1; pk¡1)):
Let
Ik ´ uk
uk ¡ uk¡1 ;
where k = 1; :::; N . Note that Ik > 1 for all k.
1This utility function is the same as in Shaked and Sutton (1982). The important assump-
tion on preferences is that consumer’s willingness to pay for quality is increasing in income.
Other types of utility functions can be used to describe preferences without significantly al-
tering the results of the model, as long as they satisfy this assumption. This claim still needs
to be tested, though, and the robustness tests are in the plans for the future versions of the
paper.
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Then t1 = p1I1 and
tk = pk¡1(1¡ Ik) + pkIk: (2)
In this stage of the game the firms simultaneously choose their prices so as
to maximize their profits taking as given the prices of their rivals.
The profit of firm k is2
¦k = (pk ¡ ck)[prob(tk < t · tk+1)] ¡ Ck, where Ck = C(uk) is the fixed
cost of producing quality k product.
Thus,
¦k = (pk ¡ ck) [F (tk+1)¡ F (tk)]¡ Ck (3)
for k = 1; :::; N ¡ 1. The profit of firm k = N is
¦N = (pN ¡ cN ) [1¡ F (tN)]¡ CN :
Each firm k = 1; :::; N solves max
pk¸0
¦k. The solution is the best response
function (possibly, a correspondence) of firm k
pBRk = pk(p1; :::; pk¡1; pk+1; :::; pN ;u1; :::; uN ):
The system of these best response functions for k = 1; :::; N forms a vector
valued best response function. The Nash equilibrium of this game is the set
of price functions
©
pNEk (u1; :::; uN )
ª
k=1;:::;N
that is a fixed point of this vector
valued best response function.
Stage 2. Choosing Optimal Qualities.
In this stage of the game firms observe the number of entrants N and simul-
taneously choose the quality of their own product uk, k = 1; :::;N .
Each firm solves:
max
u0<uk·
_
u
©
(pNEk ¡ ck) [F (tNEk+1)¡ F (tNEk )]¡ Ck
ª
(4)
where pNEk = p
NE
k (u1; :::; uN ) and t
NE
k = p
NE
k¡1(1 ¡ Ik) + pNEk Ik. Recall
also that ck and Ck are functions of uk, and Ik depends on both uk and uk¡1.
The equilibrium of this stage of the game is a vector of qualities (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ),
where u¤k is firm k’s best response to u
¤
¡k =
¡
u¤1; :::; u
¤
k¡1; u
¤
k+1; :::u
¤
N
¢
for all
k = 1; :::; N . Denote by ¦¤k the maximized value of profits of firm k, k = 1; :::;N ,
at (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ). The equilibrium qualities and profits depend on the number of
entrants in stage 1 of the game N .
Stage 1. Entry.
Denote by " the entry cost for any firm k. If a firm chooses to enter
this market it can expect to make EN [¦¤k(N)]. Thus, a firm will enter if
2There is a unit measure of consumers in this economy, thus, firm’s per capita and total
profits are the same.
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EN [¦
¤
k(N)]¡ " ¸ 0. The number of firms in the market N¤ is a Nash equilib-
rium if ¦¤k(N
¤ + 1)¡ " < 0 for some k. That is, the entry of an additional firm
would lead to some firms making negative profits net of the entry cost.
In what follows the entry cost " is assumed to be very small, so as to get the
maximum possible number of entrants in the market. That is, N¤ is considered
to be an equilibrium number of firms if ¦¤k(N
¤ + 1) = 0 for some k.
Part III
Solving the Model
In this section of the paper I discuss the computational algorithm and assump-
tions made in order to obtain the numerical solution of the model. In this
paper the solution has been obtained for the specification of the model with
no costs. Thus, for the rest of the paper I assume that ck = c(uk) = 0 and
Ck = C(uk) = 0 for all k = 1; :::; N .
3.1. Assumptions
3.1.1. Consumers’ Income Distribution and Income Inequality
The consumers’ income distribution is assumed to be lognormal3 with cdf
F (¹; ¾). Since the purpose of the paper is to study the eﬀect of income inequality
on firms’ decisions, parameters ¹ and ¾ are chosen so as to make the variance of
the income distribution vary, while keeping the mean income constant. Denote
the mean of the income distribution by A.
The standard measure of income inequality is the Gini coeﬃcient. The Gini
coeﬃcient is a number between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to
greater income inequality. According to the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme’s "Human Development Report 2006", it ranges from 0:19 in Azerbaijan
to 0:74 in Namibia with an average of about 0:4 for the 126 countries in the re-
port4. The Gini coeﬃcient can be calculated for a given continuous cdf function
as
3The lognormal distribution is often used to model the real world income distributions.
The present computer code can be easily modified for another specification of the distribution
function. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the choice of a diﬀerent distribution
function may aﬀect the existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) properties of the solution.
4According to the report, examples of countries with low income inequality include Den-
mark, Japan, and Sweden, all with Gini coeﬃcients around 0.25 in 2006. In Europe Turkey
has the highest measure of income inequality at 0.44. US has a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.41, Canada
- 0.33, and Mexico - 0.5.
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G = 1¡ 1
A
1Z
0
(1¡ F (y))2 dy;
For given ¹ and ¾ of the lognormal distribution the corresponding Gini
coeﬃcient can be computed using the formula above. The parameter ¾ is allowed
to vary from 0:34 to 1:6. For each value of ¾ from this range, the value of the
parameter ¹ is then chosen so as to keep the mean of the distribution constant
at the chosen value for A. With these specifications the Gini coeﬃcient varies
from 0:19 to 0:74, which corresponds to the range observed in the data.
3.1.2. Parameters Choice
To compute the model numerically it remains to specify the values for the
mean income A, the quality of the outside good u0, and the upper bound on
quality
_
u. Part 4 of the paper contains the results that have been obtained
for A = 15, u0 = 1, and
_
u = 10. The choice of these parameter values is
arbitrary. Preliminary computations indicate that changes in the values of these
parameters have quantitative implications, but do not aﬀect the qualitative
predictions of the model. More thorough tests are required, though, and are on
the agenda.
3.2. Computational Algorithm
The issues of existence and uniqueness of equilibria for these types of models
are typically not considered in the literature due to their extreme diﬃculty.
Instead, the focus is on studying the characteristics which equilibria must have, if
they exist. When looking for a numerical solution of the model, though, it is very
important to know whether it exists and, if so, whether it is unique. The model
here has multiple stages, and existence and uniqueness problems may arise at
each of them. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the problem the analytical
proofs are not feasible for any part of the game. I turn to the numerical methods
to verify existence and uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibria.
The computer code used to solve the model has been written with an explicit
goal of making it possible to verify at any stage of the game that what is
being found as a solution is in fact an equilibrium and, if so, whether there
are other equilibria besides the one being computed. This requirement makes
the computations more cumbersome and less eﬃcient by necessitating that a
diﬀerent procedure be used for computing stages 2 and 3 of the model for each
value of N . In the future I plan to rewrite the code relaxing this transparency
requirement to make it more eﬃcient, and testing the results against those
obtained with the current version whenever in doubt.
The model is solved using Matlab software. The procedure is repeated for
diﬀerent values of ¹ and ¾ to study the eﬀects of changes in income distribution
function parameters on the model outcomes. For each value of N stages 2 and
3 of the model are written as functions. The stage 3 function takes as given
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the vector of qualities (u1; :::; uN ) and produces the vector of Nash equilibrium
prices
¡
pNE1 (u1; :::; uN ); :::; p
NE
N (u1; :::; uN )
¢
. This function is called upon in
the body of the stage 2 function, which, for a particular value of N , attempts
to compute the Nash equilibrium qualities (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ). If it finds that the
equilibrium qualities converge to only one point, the one where all firms want to
produce
_
u, it concludes that the Nash equilibrium with firms producing distinct
qualities does not exist for a given number of entrants N 5 . The main body
of the code then calls upon another stage 2 function, the one for smaller N , to
see if there is an equilibrium with desired properties for a less crowded market.
The procedure stops when it finds the maximum N for which there exists an
equilibrium vector of qualities (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) with u
¤
i 6= u¤j for all i; j = 1; :::;N ,
i 6= j and u¤i ; u¤j 2
¡
u0;
_
u
¤
. This number of firms is the equilibrium N¤.
Here is a brief outline of the procedure:
I. Specify parameters ¹ and ¾ of the income distribution function.
II. Make a guess about the initial number of firms in the market N0.
III. Call a stage 2 function for N = N0 which seeks to find the Nash equi-
librium qualities (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ). This function uses the stage 3 function to
compute Nash equilibrium prices for any distribution of firms’ qualities.
IV. If this stage 2 function finds (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) with u
¤
i 6= u¤j , i 6= j for all
i; j = 1; :::; N , consider increasing N0 to N0 = N0 + 1 to check that there
does not exist a solution with desired properties for a greater number of
firms in the market. That is, let N0 = N0 + 1 and go back to step III.
V. If the stage 2 function does not find (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) such that u
¤
i 6= u¤j , i 6= j
for all i; j = 1; :::; N , and instead concludes that the only solution is u¤k =
_
u
for all k = 1; :::; N , then let N0 = N0 ¡ 1.
VI. Call a stage 2 function for this smaller N = N0.
VII. If the stage 2 function concludes that the only solution is u¤k =
_
u for all
k = 1; :::; N , then let N0 = N0 ¡ 1 and go back to step VI.
VIII. If the stage 2 function finds (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) with u
¤
i 6= u¤j , i 6= j for all i; j =
1; :::; N , then call this number of firms the equilibrium N¤ and the quality
vector (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) the solution to the stage 2 of the game. Compute
the Nash equilibrium prices for this vector of qualities using the stage 3
function.
5For N > 2 there is always an equilibrium with all firms producing the top quality
_
u. If
two or more firms produce
_
u, the Bertrand competition at stage 3 ensures that all firms earn
zero profits in equilibrium.
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The optimal choice of initial N would be N0 = N¤ + 1, and depends on the
parameters A, u0, and
_
u. For their values specified above N0 = 4 is suﬃcient.
Next I discuss the algorithms for computing stage 2 and 3 equilibria in
greater detail, also addressing the issues of their existence and uniqueness.
3.2.1. Stage 3: Computing Optimal Prices
The input of the stage 3 function is a vector of firms’ qualities (u1; :::; uN ).
Each firm k = 1; :::;N optimally chooses its price pk so as to maximize its
profit, taking the prices of other firms p¡k = (p1; :::; pk¡1; pk+1; :::; pN) as given.
For a given vector p¡k this is a simple single-variable constrained optimization
problem, and the best response function can be computed as pBRk = pk(p¡k).
Any point where the best response functions of all firms k = 1; :::N intersect is a
Nash equilibrium of this stage of the game. Visual tests conducted for diﬀerent
income distribution specifications, N = 2; 3; 4, and various combinations of
qualities (u1; :::; uN ) lead to the conclusion that the point of intersection exists
and is unique. I use the method of simple iterations on best response functions
to find this unique Nash equilibrium. This method is the most simple and
reliable. It can be slower than the alternative methods, but unreliability of
other methods in this case prevents their meaningful use6.
3.2.2. Stage 2: Computing Optimal Qualities
For a given N the stage 2 function searches for an equilibrium vector of
qualities (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) such that no two elements of this vector are the same.
Notice that each particular vector (u¤1; :::; u
¤
N ) corresponds to N ! equilibria in
terms of the identities of the firms. To illustrate, suppose that two firms X and
Y enter the market at stage 1. If there is an equilibrium with firm X producing
u¤1 and firm Y producing u
¤
2, then there is also an equilibrium with Y producing
u¤1 and X producing u
¤
2. For all purposes here these symmetric equilibria are
considered to be identical and are treated as one equilibrium. Thus, when
looking for equilibria with two firms producing distinct qualities I will assume
that one of the firms is producing the lower quality good while the other one is
making the higher quality one, and they both know their respective positions.
For N = 3 the respective quality positions for each of the firms are "fixed" at
low, middle, and high. There is a similar preassigned ordering for larger N .
In the model with no costs to producing higher quality the top quality firm’s
best response to any quality choices by its rivals is uN =
_
u. For N = 2 the prob-
lem at this stage is a simple one of finding u1 that maximizes firm 1’s profit, tak-
ing as given u2 =
_
u and the price functions from stage 3
¡
pNE1
¡
u1;
_
u
¢
; pNE2
¡
u1;
_
u
¢¢
.
6An alternative solution method would involve solving the system of first-order conditions.
The more eﬃcient numerical methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations are based on
replacing the problem with that of minimizing a functional. The surface of this functional
turns out to have a very irregular shape due to the assumption of the lognormal probability
density function. As a result, the solution obtained using these methods is very sensitive to
the initial guess.
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For N = 3 the procedure is looking for an intersection point of the quality best
response functions for firms 1 and 2 when u3 =
_
u and the price functions
from stage 3 are
¡
pNE1
¡
u1; u2;
_
u
¢
; pNE2
¡
u1; u2;
_
u
¢
; pNE3
¡
u1; u2;
_
u
¢¢
. Denote
the quality best response function of firm 1 by u1 = q1
¡
u2;
_
u
¢
and that of firm
2 by u2 = q2
¡
u1;
_
u
¢
. Below I plot four examples, each for an economy with
a diﬀerent value of the Gini coeﬃcient, illustrating four possible situations for
equilibria in this stage of the game.
Figure 1: Equilibria in stage 2 of the game, N = 3.
In Figure 1 a) the quality best response functions of firms 1 and 2 do not
intersect in any point besides the one where they both produce
_
u. When this is
the case, there does not exist an equilibrium with firms producing diﬀerentiated
products. The best response functions in Figure 1 b) and d) coincide in one
other point besides
¡_
u;
_
u
¢
, point S1. The conclusion in these two cases is that
the equilibrium with desired properties exists and is unique. In Figure 1 c)
the best response functions intersect in two other points, S1 and S2, where
u1; u2 6=
_
u. Thus, potentially there are two solutions with firms producing
distinct qualities. The equilibrium at S2 cannot be computed by any procedure
involving iterations, since it is non-stable. The code uses the simple iterations
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methods to compute the quality choices corresponding to S1. The quality vector
with thus chosen u1 and u2 is the solution for this stage of the game.
Similar graphs can be obtained for N > 3. Let N = 4 and denote the quality
best response functions of the three lower quality firms by u1 = q1
¡
u2; u3;
_
u
¢
,
u2 = q2
¡
u1; u3;
_
u
¢
, and u3 = q3
¡
u1; u2;
_
u
¢
. For each
¡
u3;
_
u
¢
let u1 be the
solution to u1 = q1
¡
q2
¡
u1; u3;
_
u
¢
; u3;
_
u
¢
obtained by the method of simple
iterations. Similarly, u3 solves u3 = q3
¡
u1; q2
¡
u1; u3;
_
u
¢
;
_
u
¢
for every
¡
u1;
_
u
¢
.
Denote these solutions by
^
u1 =
^
q1
¡
u3;
_
u
¢
and
^
u3 =
^
q3
¡
u1;
_
u
¢
. The problem
becomes that of finding an intersection of functions
^
q1
¡
u3;
_
u
¢
and
^
q3
¡
u1;
_
u
¢
,
if it exists. This task is analogous to the one described for the case of N = 3
above. A similar procedure can be used for N > 4.
Part IV
Results: the Model with no Costs
The degree of income dispersion, measured by the Gini coeﬃcient (G), deter-
mines the equilibrium number of firms in the market. In the economies with
G · 0:2492 only two firms choose to enter the market, that is, N¤ = 2. If
another firm was to enter, the competition for the consumers with such small
degree of heterogeneity would be so intense that it would drive the price of
the top quality firm to zero, causing all firms to earn zero profits. Thus, in
equilibrium only two firms in the market earn positive profits.
Economies with values of G above that threshold are inhabited by consumers
whose incomes are distributed less equally. Greater degree of consumer hetero-
geneity gives the firms more "room" to compete. As a result, up to three firms
can enter the market in these economies and earn positive profits and the equi-
librium number of firms is N¤ = 3. Thus, income inequality determines the
number of firms that can coexist in a vertically diﬀerentiated industry with pos-
itive market shares, with more firms inhabiting the markets in less egalitarian
economies.
In the model with no costs to producing higher quality the top quality firm
always chooses to produce the highest possible quality
_
u = 10. The optimal
quality choices of other firms depend on the degree of diﬀerentiation in con-
sumers’ incomes. Figures 2 a) and b) give, respectively, equilibrium quality and
price decisions of firms as functions of the Gini coeﬃcient G. The dotted verti-
cal line is drawn at G = 0:2492 to separate the cases for N¤ = 2 and N¤ = 3.
Figure 2 c) depicts the income levels of the marginal consumers, tk’s. Recall
that a consumer with income tk is indiﬀerent between purchasing from firm k
and k¡ 1. Thus, for example, in economies where three firms enter the market,
the demand for the top quality firm is given by the fraction of population with
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incomes above t3, the consumers with incomes between t2 and t3 buy from the
second highest quality firm, those with incomes between t1 and t2 purchase the
good of the lowest quality, and the rest choose not to buy and consume the
outside good.
Figure 2: Results of the model with no costs.
The optimal qualities are increasing functions of G, and equilibrium prices
of firms producing the lowest and the second highest quality products are lower
in the economies with higher levels of consumer income inequality. The price
of the top quality product is decreasing at first, and then becomes an increas-
ing function of G for the values of this parameter above some threshold value.
To analyze these results of the model with no costs, consider four hypotheti-
cal economies, each characterized by a diﬀerent value of the income inequality
measure G.
Figure 3 below gives the consumer income distributions for each of these
four economies. The economies are ordered by the degree of inequality in the
consumer incomes, with Economy 1 inhabited by consumers with the most equal
distribution of incomes. The vertical lines mark the income levels of the marginal
consumers, tk’s, and the shaded areas of the graphs represent the demands for
each of the firms or, equivalently, their market shares.
As G increases, the income distribution becomes more skewed to the right.
The most prevalent type of consumer (the income distribution peaks at his
12
income level) becomes increasingly more poor from Economy 1 to Economy
4, while the fraction of consumers with incomes in the middle range is rapidly
shrinking. The probability density functions of consumer incomes in the economies
with greater income inequality are characterized by thicker tails, which means
that these economies also have more consumers with incomes above the mean.
Figure 3. Probability density functions of consumer incomes in
Economies 1 through 4 and market shares of firms.
Consumers with higher incomes constitute the more attractive market for
the firms, since for each level of quality wealthier consumers have higher will-
ingness to pay. In the economies with a more egalitarian distribution of incomes
the most attractive market for the firms is composed of the middle income con-
sumers, since they are the most prevalent type. Low variability of incomes in
this group results in small diﬀerences in willingness to pay for higher quality,
and thus lower elasticity of demand for the top quality product. This allows the
top quality producer to capture most of the market by pricing low enough to
keep its inferior quality competitor serving the relatively more poor part of the
population.
Intuitively, greater homogeneity of consumer incomes leads to more intense
price competition in the last stage of the game. Its eﬀects can only be mitigated
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through greater degree of product diﬀerentiation. If more than two firms were
to enter in the Economy 1, they would not be able to locate far enough from
each other in the quality spectrum in stage 2 of the game to suﬃciently lessen
the intensity of price competition in stage 3.
Greater income inequality increases the variability of incomes of the con-
sumers in the more attractive, higher income part of the market, making the
demand for quality more elastic. The second highest quality firm can now ben-
efit by increasing the quality of its product without causing a knockout price
competition in the last stage of the game. Thus the quality of the second highest
quality good increases and the prices of two higher quality firms decline until
the middle income market becomes too small for both of the firms to share, and
the highest quality good producer "gives up" these middle class consumers to
serve exclusively the rich.
Figure 2 a) shows that the quality of the second highest quality good is in-
creasing in G, that is, in the degree of income inequality. In Figure 2 b) the
price of this good is decreasing in G, while the price of its higher quality com-
petitor is "U" - shaped. The equilibrium price of the top quality product begins
to increase in economies with very high levels of income inequality because the
consumers purchasing it are so wealthy that their demand is inelastic for higher
values of prices. Figure 2 c) also shows that the marginal consumer of the top
quality firm (t3) is becoming increasingly richer after some value of G.
Additional results are demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5. Figures 4 a) and b)
give market shares and profits of firms. Increases in income inequality induce
the low quality firm to produce better quality product and charge lower price.
Combined with the increase in the proportion of the relatively poor consumers in
the population, this leads to greater market share and higher profits for the low
quality firm. The market share and profits of the top quality firm decrease in the
level of income inequality of the consumers. Greater inequality of incomes results
in more intense quality competition between the two top quality producers,
enabling the second highest quality firm to steal some business from its top
quality competitor. The shrinking middle class eventually leads to the decline
in the second highest quality producer’s market share as well. The market shares
of all firms get closer to each other in size as the income distribution becomes
more unequal, causing the concentration to fall with greater degree of income
inequality (Figure 5 a).
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Figure 4: Additional results: market shares, profits, and market
coverage
Figure 5: Additional results: concentration and consumer welfare
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Figure 4 c) shows the total fraction of consumers in the market that choose
to purchase from one of the firms as a function of the degree of inequality in
incomes. Observe that at G = 0:2492, when an additional firm chooses to en-
ter the market, the market is almost covered. Further increases in the income
inequality measure are manifested in larger fraction of the consumers with low
incomes, who cannot be induced to buy even the lowest quality good, notwith-
standing its lower price and better quality. The consumers that do end up
purchasing from one of the firms benefit from the more intense price and qual-
ity competition among the firms that accompany increases in income inequality.
Thus, aggregate consumer welfare is higher in less egalitarian economies (Figure
5 b).
Part V
Conclusion and Further Plans
In this paper I study how income inequality among consumers aﬀects the deci-
sions of firms operating in vertically diﬀerentiated industries. The model used to
address this question is due to Shaked and Sutton (1982). This model makes the
following important assumptions: a) each consumer chooses at most one good
out of a variety of products diﬀerentiated in quality; b) consumers have diﬀer-
ent incomes, and richer consumers are willing to pay more for better products;
c) the products are supplied by firms that compete by choosing qualities and
prices in a non-cooperative three-stage game, with each firm supplying only one
type of quality; and d) there are no fixed or variable costs to producing higher
quality products. In order to study the eﬀects of changes in income inequality
on model outcomes, I assume a lognormal distribution for consumer incomes
and solve the model numerically, holding the mean of the distribution constant
while changing the variance.
The results demonstrate that income inequality impacts the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation in the market through its eﬀect on the elasticity of consumer
demand for product quality. The industries in the economies with greater in-
come inequality are characterized by a greater number of firms and more intense
quality competition. This is due to the demand for quality being more elastic
in the economies with less egalitarian distributions of incomes. In the model
with no costs to producing higher quality the top quality product is always
produced independently of the degree of consumer heterogeneity, but the qual-
ities of other firms’ products rise with the increases in income inequality. The
more intense quality competition induces firms to locate their products in higher
ranges of the quality spectrum and closer to each other. Thus, higher income
inequality among consumers decreases the degree of product diﬀerentiation in
the market. Lower heterogeneity of product qualities leads to more intense price
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competition, pushing down the prices of all firms in the market. However, in
the economies where income inequality is very high, the top quality producer
chooses to serve only the rich consumers; their demand is more price inelastic,
which enables him to charge a higher price. Also, market shares and profits
of all firms are distributed more equally in less egalitarian economies, and the
consumers are better of in terms of aggregate welfare.
For the model described above, with all of the assumptions unaltered, it
remains to properly investigate the robustness of results to changes in the values
for the mean income A, the quality of the outside good u0, and the upper bound
on quality
_
u. Preliminary computations performed thus far indicate that the
qualitative predictions of the model are not aﬀected by diﬀerent assumptions
on these parameter values.
The robustness of the results to diﬀerent specifications for the utility function
will also be studied. Intuitively, the results should hold for any specification of
the utility function as long as it has the property that willingness to pay for
quality is increasing in consumer’s income.
Another important assumption that needs to be relaxed is that of zero costs
to producing higher quality. I intend to compute the model for nonzero cost
functions c(u) and C(u). The results of the model with costs can then be tested
empirically7. This is the subject of my next paper.
7Berry and Waldfogel (2003) empirically investigate how market size aﬀects the level of
top quality on oﬀer and product concentration in vertically diﬀerentiated industries. One of
the industries they study is the restaurants industry in the US. The data sources they use are
rich enough to allow investigation of the eﬀects of income inequality on the degree of product
diﬀerentiation and price levels.
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